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revealing﻿ hidden﻿ computing﻿ process.﻿ Leveraging﻿microarchitectural﻿ resources,﻿ adversaries﻿ can﻿














various﻿ applications﻿ as﻿ they﻿ run﻿ on﻿ the﻿ processor.﻿A﻿SCA﻿–﻿ both﻿ theoretical﻿ (Hu,﻿ 1992,﻿ Page,﻿
2002)﻿and﻿practical﻿(Bernstein,﻿2005;﻿Osvik﻿et﻿al.,﻿2006)﻿–﻿is﻿carried﻿out﻿through﻿the﻿exploitation﻿
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threats﻿ that﻿are﻿made﻿to﻿wait﻿ for﻿access﻿ to﻿functional﻿units﻿(Ge﻿et﻿al.,﻿2016;﻿Tromer﻿et﻿al.,﻿2010;﻿
Ristenpart﻿et﻿al.,﻿2009).
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1.1. Key Contributions and the Methodology Followed



































1.3. Outline of the Paper
The﻿ remainder﻿ of﻿ the﻿ paper﻿ is﻿ structured﻿ as﻿ follows:﻿ Section﻿ 2﻿ provides﻿ a﻿ background﻿ for﻿
Microarchitectural﻿Analysis.﻿ In﻿Section﻿3,﻿Timing-Based﻿Side-Channel﻿Attack﻿are﻿presented﻿and﻿
examined﻿ in﻿ detail,﻿while﻿ in﻿Section﻿4,﻿Side-Channel﻿Attacks﻿ against﻿RSA﻿ implementations﻿ are﻿
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Attack﻿ against﻿ a﻿weak﻿ system﻿would﻿not﻿be﻿ computationally﻿difficult﻿ and﻿often﻿necessitate﻿only﻿
ciphertext.﻿His﻿study﻿revealed﻿that﻿attackers﻿could﻿make﻿relatively﻿precise﻿timing﻿calculations﻿that﻿
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3. TIMING-BASed SIde-CHANNeL ATTACKS

























networks﻿ for﻿ covert﻿ communication.﻿This﻿ seminal﻿ study﻿became﻿ the﻿ foundation﻿ for﻿many﻿other﻿
studies﻿(Wendzel﻿et﻿al.,﻿2015;﻿Mazurczyk﻿et﻿al.,﻿2014;﻿Geddes﻿et﻿al.,﻿2013;﻿Luo﻿et﻿al.,﻿2008;﻿Zander﻿










(Brumley﻿ and﻿Tuveri,﻿ 2011;﻿Aciiçmez﻿ et﻿ al.,﻿ 2005;﻿Kocher,﻿ 1996).﻿This﻿ denotes﻿ that﻿ by﻿ taking﻿
advantage﻿of﻿ such﻿differences,﻿ an﻿adversary﻿can﻿potentially﻿compromise﻿a﻿cryptosystem﻿ through﻿
the﻿ observation﻿ of﻿ the﻿ time﻿ required﻿ to﻿ run﻿ cryptographic﻿ algorithms﻿ (Pornin,﻿ 2017;﻿ Schneier,﻿
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Furthermore,﻿ adversaries﻿ can﻿ also﻿ launch﻿ a﻿ remote﻿TBSCA﻿against﻿OpenSSL﻿by﻿ exploiting﻿
the﻿inherent﻿susceptibility﻿that﻿exists﻿in﻿OpenSSL﻿(in﻿the﻿Montgomery﻿ladder﻿in﻿the﻿Elliptic﻿Curve﻿
Cryptosystem)﻿in﻿order﻿to﻿extract﻿the﻿secret﻿key﻿of﻿a﻿TLS﻿server﻿(Benger﻿et﻿al.,﻿2014;﻿Yarom﻿and﻿
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consisting﻿of﻿Flush,﻿Flush+Reload﻿ Interval﻿ and﻿Reload.﻿Stage﻿one,﻿Flush,﻿ involves﻿ flushing﻿ the﻿
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3.9. Timing Attacks Against Floating-Point Instructions
An﻿attacker﻿can﻿also﻿launch﻿a﻿TBSCA﻿against﻿the﻿floating-point﻿instructions﻿of﻿modern﻿x86﻿processors﻿
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There﻿exist﻿other﻿ways﻿of﻿ launching﻿TBSCAs﻿ in﻿various﻿platforms,﻿ the﻿analysis﻿of﻿which﻿ is﻿
beyond﻿the﻿scope﻿of﻿this﻿paper﻿due﻿to﻿the﻿page﻿constraints.






4.1. Overview of RSA Algorithm




a﻿ pair﻿ of﻿ different﻿ cryptographic﻿ keys﻿ to﻿ perform﻿ encryption﻿ and﻿ decryption.﻿ Both﻿ keys﻿ are﻿
mathematically﻿connected,﻿denoting﻿that﻿a﻿message﻿encrypted﻿by﻿the﻿algorithm﻿using﻿one﻿key﻿can﻿
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Attacks﻿ (TBSCAs),﻿ and﻿ demonstrated﻿ their﻿ devastating﻿ impacts﻿ on﻿ shared,﻿modern﻿ computing﻿
hardware.﻿We﻿thoroughly﻿reviewed﻿relevant﻿literature﻿within﻿the﻿context﻿and﻿we﻿discussed﻿various﻿
attack﻿ vectors﻿ that﻿ attackers﻿ can﻿ adopt﻿ to﻿mount﻿ such﻿ attacks﻿ against﻿ components﻿ of﻿modern﻿
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